The bulk of international trade takes place in intermediate inputs as opposed to goods for …nal consumption. Studies of …rm-level data show that there is substantial heterogeneity in the shares …rms spend on imported inputs, and that a …rm's productivity increases with the quantity and variety of inputs that it imports. This paper develops a model to quantify the contributions of …rm-level productivity gains from importing to aggregate productivity and welfare gains from trade. In the model, …rms choose the fraction of their inputs to import; importing a higher fraction of inputs raises …rm-level productivity, but requires higher upfront …xed costs. Therefore, …rms with di¤erent underlying pro…tability will vary in how much they import and the productivity they gain from doing so. Trade liberalization results in heterogeneous within-…rm productivity gains, as plants di¤er in the extent to which they adjust their import shares. This heterogeneity provides aggregate productivity and welfare gains from trade that would not exist in a world in which …rms used identical input bundles. These gains are consistent with data on historical trade liberalization episodes that show large …rm-level productivity gains attributed to higher imports of intermediate inputs.
Introduction
Intermediate inputs comprise about half of international trade in goods for most industrialized countries, and international trade theory has for a long time dealt explicitly with goods used in production as distinct from trade in goods for …nal consumption.
1 Until recently, the bulk of this work has been based on models in which all producers use an identical bundle of imported and domestic goods. However, a recent literature examining …rm-and plant-level data has found that imported inputs are concentrated among relatively few producers, and there is substantial heterogeneity among them in the share of input expenditures spent on imports. 2 The goals of this paper are to quantitatively evaluate the welfare gains from trade in a model that takes this heterogeneity into account, and to assess how important this heterogeneity is in evaluating aggregate gains from trade. Much of the existing literature on international trade in models with heterogeneous producers focuses on the e¤ect of trade in reallocating resources across plants. In models based on Melitz (2003) , the prospect of increased export sales from opening to foreign markets induces larger, more productive plants to grow relative to smaller, unproductive plants, and this can raise aggregate productivity and welfare. However, existing evidence from plantlevel data shows that there are large within-plant productivity gains from trade in addition to such reallocation. 3 In particular, plants that use imported intermediate goods experience productivity gains from trade liberalization. 4 In this paper, I develop a general equilibrium model that captures these within-plant gains associated with increased openness to trade. In the model, using imported intermediate goods raises plant-level productivity, but it is increasingly costly to import a large fraction of inputs. Plants import di¤erent shares of their inputs, generating a cross-section of heterogeneous responses to a trade liberalization. In a version of the model calibrated to Chilean plant-level data, this heterogeneity amounts to a signi…cant source of gains from trade: without the heterogeneity, the aggregate welfare and productivity gains from trade would be about 40 percent lower. In the model, plants producing a …nal good use a continuum of intermediate inputs, any of which can be produced domestically or abroad. Intermediate goods are produced in di¤erent countries with di¤erent technologies, as in the Ricardian model of Eaton and Kortum (2002) . For each input, a plant chooses whether to pay a …xed cost to optimally source the input from the cheapest location, or to simply purchase it domestically. A fraction of those inputs sourced will actually be imported. Optimally sourcing a higher fraction lowers input prices, so a plant that sources (and hence imports) a higher fraction of inputs appears more productive -it produces more output with the same expenditure on inputs -than a plant that sources fewer inputs. Plants di¤er in their underlying e¢ ciency, and more e¢ cient plants choose to source a higher share of their inputs, while the least e¢ cient choose to purchase everything domestically. Importing plants, therefore, are larger and more productive, both because they take advantage of the productivity gains of optimally sourcing inputs, and because they tend to be more e¢ cient producers. The model generates cross-sectional dispersion in import shares and plant size, and relates moments of these cross-sectional distributions to parameters governing heterogeneity and the costs and bene…ts of importing. I use Chilean plant-level data over the period 1986-1996 to calibrate these parameters. The model's general equilibrium structure allows me to conduct counterfactuals to evaluate the welfare gains from trade. Compared to autarky, the openness to trade at the level in the Chilean data generates close to a three percent increase in the levels of both total welfare and aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). Heterogeneity in importing matters for these gains, in the sense that evaluating gains from trade ignoring this heterogeneity would provide a substantial underestimate. To show this result, I solve a version of my model with no …xed costs of importing, and thus no heterogeneity in import shares, and calibrate it to generate the same level of trade as the original model. In this model with all plants importing, the welfare and aggregate productivity gains from trade are about 40 percent lower than in the model with heterogeneity in importing. The reason behind this di¤erence is that, accounting for heterogeneity in import shares means that the within-plant productivity gain from trade di¤ers across plants; these within-plant productivity gains translate into bigger aggregate gains when they are concentrated in large plants that account for a large fraction of total output.
This model provides a new set of results relative to the literature on the gains from trade in general equilibrium models. Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2012) show that in a broad class of models, heterogeneity -and the reallocation in response to trade liberalization that this heterogeneity entails -does not contribute additional welfare gains from trade. They demonstrate that, with the distributional assumptions commonly used in this class of models, a model with heterogeneous plants generates the same welfare gains from trade as one without, if they generate the same size of trade ‡ows. By contrast, in this paper I show that taking into account the within-plant productivity gains from imported inputs that have been documented empirically, a model with heterogeneous plants provides a very di¤erent quantitative picture of the aggregate gains from trade than a model that ignores heterogeneity. This paper builds on recent empirical and theoretical work examining producer-level heterogeneity in the use of imported inputs. Amiti and Konings (2007) , Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008) , and Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2009) provide evidence that using imported inputs raises plant-level productivity. Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010) also measure the bene…ts of imported inputs using data on …rms, though they measure the e¤ects on the number of products …rms produce, not on their productivity. Most related to this paper is Gopinath and Neiman (2011) , who show that heterogeneity in the adjustment of the number of inputs imported by Argentinean …rms contributes to high-frequency movements in aggregate productivity. Gopinath and Neiman use detailed customs transactions data, which allows them to decompose product-level changes in imports, but requires excluding non-importing producers from the analysis. In contrast, I use plant-level data that reports input expenditures at a higher level of aggregation than the product level, but includes information on non-importing manufacturing plants; including these plants that do not import is important for evaluating aggregate gains from trade. In addition, the general equilibrium nature of my exercise allows me to translate productivity gains into welfare gains.
Section 2 below sets out the model. Section 3 discuss how to relate parameters to the cross-sectional distribution of import shares and plant size, and performs a numerical simulation of the model calibrated to Chilean plant-level data. Section 3 also quanti…es the gains from trade in the calibrated model.
Model
The model economy consists of J 2 countries in which production takes place in two stages: internationally tradeable intermediate goods are produced with labor, and a …nal, nontradable good is produced using labor and intermediate goods. The …nal good is produced by heterogeneous plants that di¤er in their e¢ ciency and in the fraction of goods they choose to import. All producers are perfectly competitive.
Production and prices of intermediate goods
Intermediate goods production is similar to the Ricardian models of Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977) and Eaton and Kortum (2002) . Producers in each country have technologies to produce a continuum of intermediate goods labelled ! 2 [0; 1]. Good ! can be produced with labor in country i with e¢ ciency z i (!). Denoting the wage rate in country i as w i , the cost of producing a unit of good ! in country i is
. As in Eaton and Kortum (2002) , z i (!) is the realization of a random variable drawn independently and identically across ! and i from a Frechet distribution,
Here, T i controls the level and the dispersion of e¢ ciency draws within country i.
Intermediate goods are tradeable, but producers face proportional trade costs when selling internationally: in order to sell one unit of any good ! in country j, a producer in country i must produce ij units, where ij > 1 if i 6 = j and ii = 1. Since producers are perfectly competitive, the price of a good sold from i to j is
The distribution of prices of goods that country j can potentially buy from country i is:
Input sourcing and …nal good production
A continuum of mass one of heterogeneous plants produce the …nal good in each country using labor`and a composite of intermediate inputs x, according to:
where + < 1. Although plants are perfectly competitive and produce a homogeneous …nal good, plants with di¤erent e¢ ciencies will coexist because of decreasing returns to scale. Plants'e¢ ciencies z are distributed in country j according to a Pareto distribution with density
The composite intermediate input is given by the Cobb-Douglas aggregator:
wherex (!) refers to units of good ! and x is units of the composite input.
Two extremes
If a plant were to buy every intermediate good from the cheapest location worldwide, then, as Eaton and Kortum (2002) show, the fraction of country j plants' intermediate input expenditures that is spent on goods from country i would be:
and the price of a unit of the composite input in country j would be:
In contrast, if a plant purchased all intermediate goods domestically, then the price p d j of the composite input bundle would be equal to just the country j term in the expression above for p
which is higher than p s j for any > 0.
Costly sourcing of imports
To introduce di¤erences in importing behavior across plants, suppose that it is costly to source each input from the cheapest location (hereafter referred to simply as "sourcing") rather than just buy it from domestic suppliers. This cost is a stand-in for the costs of searching for and maintaining a relationship with a foreign supplier, or the costs of testing and …nding out whether an imported product is an appropriate substitute for a domestic one. Speci…cally, if a plant sources a fraction n of its inputs, it has to pay g (n) = b (f n 1) in units of labor. I assume f > 1, so that the total cost a plant pays is increasing and convex in the fraction of goods sourced. In addition g (0) = 0, so the …xed cost associated with sourcing nothing and purchasing everything from domestic suppliers is normalized to zero.
The bene…t of sourcing a larger fraction of inputs is that it lowers the price index of the input bundle: if a plant in country j sources n inputs, then the price index among those n goods is given by p s j as de…ned in (3), while the price index for the remainder of the inputs is given by p d j , in (4).
5 Therefore, the price for a unit of the overall input bundle if a plant 5 Although this model is static, there is an implicit timing assumption: plants choose the fraction n of inputs to source before the realization of intermediate good producers'e¢ ciencies z i (!). This assumption generates the formula for the price index p j (n) in (5), and allows the closed-form solution to plants'optimal choice of n below. sources n of the inputs is
is decreasing in n: plants that source a higher fraction of their inputs face lower per-unit input costs. Using (3) and (4),
where jj , still given by the formula in (2), is the fraction of expenditures on the n sourced inputs that is purchased domestically, and 1 jj is the fraction of these goods imported. Overall then, a plant that sources n of its inputs spends a fraction n (1 jj ) on imported inputs, and n jj + 1 n on domestic goods.
The input sourcing and production choices of plants can be separated into two steps: …rst choose input quantities to maximize variable pro…t, given a sourcing policy (i.e., given an n), then choose n to maximize overall pro…ts given the optimal quantity decisions.
The variable pro…t of a plant in country j with e¢ ciency z that has chosen to source n of its inputs is given by:
where P j is the price of the …nal good in country j. The pro…t maximizing choices of inputs and output are:`j
These choices can be written,`j (z; n) = w j zv j n j (7)
where
Maximized variable pro…t given n is then:
Since jj 1, j 1, so given n, a plant with higher z is larger in terms of labor, intermediate expenditure, and outputs, and has higher pro…ts. Now, the choice of n and total pro…t of a plant with e¢ ciency z in country j are determined by
Variable pro…t rises exponentially with n, at rate j , while the …xed cost of sourcing inputs also rises exponentially at rate f . As shown in the appendix, (1) a su¢ cient condition for the solution to this problem to exist and be unique is that f > j ; and (2) if that is the case, then the optimal choice of n for a plant with e¢ ciency z in country j is: j source all of their inputs, and purchase a fraction jj of these inputs domestically. Between these two thresholds, the fraction of inputs sourced is linear in the log of e¢ ciency, with slope j = 1 log f log j . Notice that the su¢ cient condition for existence and uniqueness of this solution (f > j ) also implies that n j (z) is increasing in z: more e¢ cient plants source a higher share of their inputs. In this range, the import share, n j (z) (1 jj ), is increasing with z, so more e¢ cient plants import a larger share of their intermediate inputs. Also, since size -measured by either labor, output, or total intermediate expenditures -is increasing in e¢ ciency z (from (7)- (9), size and import share are positively related. In practice, when calibrating this model, the moments I match relating size and importing behavior guarantee that f > j . Figure 1 illustrates an example for the functional form of n j (z), juxtaposed against the distribution of e¢ ciency levels h j (z) (the parameters are those calibrated below). The interaction of the exogenous heterogeneity in e¢ ciency and the choice of n generates a distribution for import shares, s j (z) = (1 jj ) n j (z). Among those plants that import a positive amount, ignoring for a moment the restriction that n j (z) 1,
Heterogeneity in import shares
Therefore, the cumulative distribution function of import shares, for s > 0, is:
The distribution of import shares is an exponential distribution with parameter (1 jj ) j up to the point 1 jj , and has a mass point at 1 jj . The mass of this point is equal to the fraction of plants that source all of their intermediate inputs, and hence import a share 
Market clearing and equilibrium
A representative consumer in each country j values consumption of the …nal good, inelastically supplies labor at the level L j , and receives the pro…ts of all …nal good plants. The consumer spends this income on consumption of the …nal good produced by plants, so the budget constraint is
The market clearing condition for labor requires that the labor used by intermediate goods producers plus the labor used by …nal good plants in each country j adds up to L j . Since intermediate goods producers are perfectly competitive, their total payments to labor equal their sales, which are:
The …rst line in (12) is total sales to plants in all countries sourcing intermediate goods from country j. Plants in each country k with e¢ ciency z spend a fraction jk n k (z) of their intermediate expenditures p k (n k (z)) x k (z; n k (z)) on j's goods, and there are mass h k (z) of plants with each e¢ ciency level z. The second line is additional sales to …nal good plants within j of the goods that they decide not to source, and hence must purchase from country j's intermediate good producers. Each plant in j with e¢ ciency z spends a fraction 1 n j (z) of its intermediate expenditures on its own country's intermediate goods in this way.
Payments to labor by …nal good plants (both for production and for …xed costs) is given by:
So the labor market clearing condition states that (12) and (13) equal total payments to labor:
Finally, balanced trade requires that country j's exports,
which, rearranging, gives
An equilibrium consists of a set of wages w j and …nal good prices P j such that, given the plant-level decisions characterized in the previous subsection, the market clearing condition for labor and the trade balance condition hold for each country.
Using the plant-level input decisions in (7)- (8) and (10), the labor market clearing condition and trade balance condition in each country j can be written in terms of three moments of the distribution of z,
and
The three terms are related to aggregate revenue of …nal-good producing plants (which is equal to Y j ), aggregate imports of intermediate goods (which is equal to (1 jj ) M j ), and aggregate payments for …xed costs (which is equal to w j Hj ). Total …nal consumption C j is then equal to the value of total labor income plus pro…ts,
The link between importing and productivity
In this model, importing raises plant-level productivity when input expenditures are measured across plants using common price de ‡ators, as is standard in plant-level data sets. Sourcing some inputs (and importing a fraction of those inputs sourced) lowers the prices on average that a plant pays for its input bundle. Productivity then appears higher at plants that import some of their inputs because they produce more output with the same expenditures on inputs, compared to plants that purchase all of their inputs domestically. The output of a plant in country j with e¢ ciency z can be written:
whereŷ j (z) = y j (z; n j (z)) is the output of a plant with e¢ ciency z (who chooses to source a fraction n j (z) of inputs), with other variables de…ned similarly.X j (z) are expenditures on intermediate goods by the plant,
De ‡ating intermediate expenditures by any common price index P I , total factor productivity (TFP) measured at the plant level iŝ
Therefore, comparing across plants, those who choose higher n, and hence pay a lower input price p j (n j (z)), appear more productive that those that choose a lower n.
6
As a function of the import expenditure share, s j (z) = n j (z) (1 jj ), the gain (in logs) in productivity for a plant relative to sourcing none of its inputs (and purchasing them all from domestic suppliers) is, using the form for p j (n) in (6):
> 0, the productivity gain of importing is increasing in a plant's import share. The magnitude of this productivity e¤ect depends directly on two parameters -, the share of intermediate inputs in total costs, and , the degree of heterogeneity in the prices of intermediate inputs -as well as the fraction of sourced inputs that are optimally purchased domestically in equilibrium, jj . The lower is , the greater the dispersion in prices of intermediate inputs, so the greater is the incentive to exploit comparative advantage by sourcing inputs. Also,
is decreasing in jj , so that the less open a country is, the lower is the productivity gain from sourcing inputs. 6 An alternative way to de…ne the labor input is to include the …xed costs of sourcing. Plants that import a higher fraction of goods require more resources in the form of the …xed cost for sourcing, which o¤sets some of the gain in output. In the quantitative analysis, I also report the following measure of TFP in terms of total labor input,L j (z) =^j (z) + g (n j (z)):
Quantitative Analysis
In this section, I analyze the model's quantitative implications for productivity and welfare in a setting with two countries. I calibrate several parameters to cross-sectional facts from Chilean plant-level data, so I take the two countries to be Chile (country 1) and the rest of the world (country 2). Table 1 summarizes the parameter values. I choose the share parameters in production, = 0:5 and = 0:35, so that 50% of gross output goes to intermediate input expenditures, and 70% of value-added (gross output net of intermediate expenditures) is paid to labor. I assume that the lower bound of productivity draws in the …nal good, z j , the labor endowment L j , and the level parameter of the Frechet distribution T j are all equal within a country, z j = L j = T j . Alvarez and Lucas (2007) use a similar assumption that labor force and the technology level are proportional within each country. Additionally, I set z 1 = L 1 = T 1 = 1 as a normalization. Given the rest of the parameters, the levels of T 2 and 12 determine the share of Chile in world GDP and aggregate Chilean imports as a share of Chilean GDP.
Calibration
The remaining parameters determine the levels and dispersion of importing and size among importing and nonimporting plants in the model. These are the variable importing cost, 21 , the dispersion in intermediate good e¢ ciencies , the shape parameter for the Pareto distribution of …nal good e¢ ciencies, and the parameters of the …xed cost function b and f . I choose these …ve parameters so that the model matches averages of moments in Chilean manufacturing plant-level data over the period 1987-1996, as described in the following subsections. 
Average and standard deviation of import shares
Given the distribution of import shares G 1 (s) derived in (11), the average import share in country 1 (Chile) is
The variance of import shares, similarly, is
These two statistics uniquely pin down the two factors 1 = 1 (log f 1 log 1 ) and 11 .
The dispersion in imports among importers
For a given import share s, a high e¢ ciency plant would be larger than a low e¢ ciency plant, measured by labor used or inputs purchased. But high e¢ ciency plants also choose high import shares. Therefore, the dispersion in heterogeneity in size from the exogenous variation in z is magni…ed through the dispersion in import shares generated by the curvature of the …xed cost function. The relationship between dispersion in size and the curvature parameter f can be expressed in terms of percentiles of the distribution of imports among importing plants.
Let z (q) j be the qth percentile of the conditional distribution of e¢ ciencies among plants with nonzero import shares in country j, that is, the level above which there are (100 q) % of the importing plants:
1=
Since total import purchases M j (z) = (1 jj ) n j (z) p j (n j (z)) x j (z; n j (z)) are a monotonically nondecreasing function of z, the qth percentile of the distribution of imports among importing plants is given by M
. As long as q is not so large that z (q) j z 1 j (so that the import share for the plant at the qth percentile is interior), this quantity is given by:
Now, consider the ratio of two percentiles, q and r:
100 r 100 q (1+ j log j )= log 100 q 100 log 100 r 100
So given two percentiles of the distribution of imports, their ratio pins down the factor:
1 + j log j = log f log f log j Given a mean import share for Chile, s 1 , which determines (log f log 1 ), the ratio of any two interior percentiles of the distribution of import expenditures,
, can be used to uniquely identify f .
For given mean and dispersion of the import share, a larger f makes the ratio
larger for any two percentiles, q > r. A larger f makes it more costly for large plants to raise their import ratio, so dispersion in size grows without increasing the dispersion in import shares.
The fraction of plants importing
Plants with e¢ ciency draws above z 
The average size of importing relative to nonimporting plants
The total expenditures on inputs by a plant with e¢ ciency z are:
The average size, measured by total inputs, of importing plants is
while the average size of nonimporting plants is
The ratio of these two can be written (see appendix for derivation):
is the fraction of plants importing, & 1j = = j and & 2j = 1 + j log j = are parameter combinations that are pinned down by the average import share and the ratio of import percentiles derived above, and jj is determined from the average and standard deviation of import shares.
Therefore, given targets for the other moments, the ratio of the average size of importing plants relative to nonimporting plants in Chile,
, identi…es through equation (17).
Chilean Manufacturing Data and Model Fit
I choose the seven parameters T 2 ; 12 ; 21 ; ; f; ; and b to match …ve moments in the model -the average import share among importing plants, the standard deviation of the import share among importing plants, the fraction of plants importing, the 75/25 percentile ratio of imports among importing plants, and the average size of importers relative to nonimporters -to the data from Chile's manufacturing census, as well as two moments from aggregate data, Chile's share of world GDP and Chile's import/GDP ratio.
7 Table 2 displays the data for these moments over the period [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] . I use the averages of each moment as calibration targets. On average, about 23% of plants report purchasing positive amounts of imported inputs. Among these plants, the average import share is 33% of total intermediate input expenditures, and the standard deviation of import shares across plants is about 27%. The average 75/25 ratio indicates that the importer at the 75th percentile imports about 15.4 times as much as the importer at the 25th percentile of the distribution of import expenditures. And relative to nonimporting plants, importing plants are on average 4.5 times as large as measured by their total expenditures on intermediate inputs. Figures 2 and 3 show the cumulative distributions of the import share and (de-meaned) log imports for each year in the data, along with the model's predictions. Choosing parameters to match the moments discussed above does a fairly good job at …tting the entire cross-sectional distribution in import shares and import expenditures among importers in the data, except that the model generates too many plants who source all their inputs (resulting in an import share of 1 11 = 0:94). Among these plants, there is one less source of heterogeneity in import expenditures, hence the abrupt compression in the model's distribu- Figure 3 . The maximum absolute di¤erences between the model and data distributions, averaged across years, are 0:053 (import shares) and 0:042 (log imports).
The productivity advantage of importing
In my model, plants gain by importing through lowering the price index for the input bundle they purchase. Looking across plants within a period, plants that import a higher share of their inputs appear more productive, even aside from the fact that plants with inherently higher e¢ ciency z have higher import shares. Although calibrated to match moments on heterogeneity in size and import shares (and not productivity measures), the model's structure links the calibrated parameters to an implied gain in productivity from importing.
Several recent empirical studies have estimated this kind of productivity advantage of importing in plant-level data, including Amiti and Konings (2007) using Indonesian data, Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2009) using Hungarian data, and Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008) using a subset of the Chilean data considered here.
8 These papers all estimate production Chilean Data, 1987 Data, -1996 Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of log imports, relative to mean functions that relate a plant's output to its factor inputs and intermediate expenditures, along with indicators of whether the plant imports any of its inputs, or its import expenditure share (or both). In my model, as described in subsection 2.4, the plant-level production technology can be represented as a function of inputs`and X and a plant's import share s as follows:
The percentage gain in productivity for a plant with productivity z that uses imported inputs relative to not using imported inputs is given by the factor s (z) (1 11 ) log
With the calibrated parameters, (1 11 ) log 1 11 = 0:41, which implies that a plant gains 4:1% in productivity by increasing its import share by 10 percentage points (that is, gains 4:1% in output for given expenditures on all its inputs). The average productivity gain across all importing plants is given by s 1 (1 11 ) log 1 11 = 0:135, so that an importing plant on average is 13:5% more productive than a nonimporting plant, controlling for di¤erences in their exogenous e¢ ciency. These numbers are similar in magnitude to those reported by is because the cost of production decreases (which similar to the increase in productivity considered here), so that producing new products becomes pro…table. Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008) in their analysis of Chilean plant data. Using a continuous import share variable, their range of estimates imply that raising the import share by 10 percentage points raises productivity by 0:5% to 2:7%. Using a discrete import status variable, they …nd that importing raises productivity on average by between 18% and 21%. Results of similar magnitudes are reported in Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2009) and Amiti and Konings (2007) .
The gains from trade
To quantitatively evaluate the gains from trade, I solve the model in autarky, i.e. 21 = 1, meaning 11 = 1. The measure of welfare is the value of …nal consumption in country 1, or equivalently, the real value of income, from (16). The welfare gain from trade is then the di¤erence in real income, or …nal consumption, in the equilibrium with trade relative to the autarky equilibrium. The …rst number in Table 3 contains the results from this welfare calculation. The welfare gain from trade is equivalent to 2.68 percent of consumption. Since this is a static model, this should be interpreted as a permanent increase in consumption of 2.68 percent in perpetuity. The second and third numbers in the …rst column of Table 3 decompose this welfare gain in terms of real labor income and pro…ts. Moving from autarky to trade raises the real wage paid to labor, since importing raises total factor productivity at some plants; however, the …xed costs associated with importing reduce the income earned as pro…ts. To asses the role of heterogeneity in importing in generating gains from trade, I also solve a model in which all plants import (or b = 0 in the import cost function), that is calibrated to match the aggregate share of imports in total input expenditures, and the elasticity of this import expenditure share with respect to a change in 21 in the equilibrium of the model with heterogeneity. Then, each model economy generates the same amount of trade when they are open, and the same growth in trade in response to small changes in openness. In the spirit of Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2012) , this experiment allows one to ask whether considering heterogeneity in import behavior generates additional gains from trade over those that exist in a model with no heterogeneity in importing. The values for these two statistics are 35.8 percent for the import share, and 6.44 for the trade elasticity. Maintaining these values in the model with all plants importing requires setting = 13:43 and 21 = 1:71.
The welfare gains from trade in the model with all plants importing are in the second column of Table 3 . Moving from autarky to trade generates a welfare gain of 1.67 percent. Since pro…ts are a constant share of income in this model with all plants importing and no …xed costs, both labor income and pro…ts rise by the same amount. Comparing the two models, the model with heterogeneity in importing generates welfare gains that are about 60 percent larger than the model with all plants importing. Therefore, taking into account heterogeneity in importing signi…cantly raises the welfare bene…ts of trade.
The right half of Table 3 shows the two models' results when variable trade costs are reduced by a small amount. Both models generate the same amount of growth in the import share (30 percent). Again, the model with heterogeneity in import shares generates an increase in welfare that is higher -by about 37 percent -than the model with all plants importing.
Changes in plant-level TFP
The gains from trade are di¤erent in these two models because of the way the productivity gains of importing are distributed across plants. Intuitively, for a given share of imported goods, spreading those imports proportionally across all plants raises their productivity by a …xed percentage, thereby raising aggregate value added in the economy. The results of Table 3 show that distributing the same share of imports alternatively -in a way that raises productivity the most at the largest plants -raises aggregate value added more.
To illustrate this connection, I compare the following measure of plant-level TFP to compare across the benchmark calibration and autarky:
In each case (benchmark, autarky), y j (z) ;`j (z) ; g (n j (z)) ; X j (z) are output, labor for production, labor for …xed costs, and intermediate expenditures of a plant with e¢ ciency z, and w j is the equilibrium wage in each case. I use the index T Average TFP growth in the benchmark model relative to autarky is the di¤erence between diamond-marked line labelled "Benchmark" and the dashed line labelled "Autarky," integrated against the density of e¢ ciencies. The di¤erence between average TFP growth with and without heterogeneity is the di¤erence between the diamond line and the circlemarked line labelled "All plants importing,"integrated against the density. The magnitude of the di¤erence between the diamond line and the circle line in the right hand side of the …g-ure is large, but this is exactly where the density puts little weight, so this di¤erence averages out to be only slightly positive (about 0.18%). However, since plants with high z account for a higher share of output, they contribute more to aggregate output than suggested by such an unweighted average. Table 4 reports two measures of average TFP growth relative to autarky in the benchmark model, along with an aggregate measure of TFP, where the plant-level terms in (19) are replaced with economy-wide aggregates. In the model with all plants importing, every number in table 4 would be 1.67 percent, exactly the same as the welfare gain. In the …rst column, the average productivity gain across all plants is only 1.85 percent. However, aggregate TFP grows by much more, 2.94 percent, relative to autarky, than the 1.67 percent of the model with all plants importing. The last number in the …rst column shows the average TFP gain among plants that import when the economy is open to trade is about 8 percent; this number is much higher than either of the previous two, and indicates the importance of incorporating the presence of nonimporting plants in calculating aggregate gains from trade. Finally, the second column of the table reports measures that ignore the labor used in …xed costs when calculating TFP. Clearly, since opening to trade requires using resources for …xed costs that are being ignored in the calculation of the second column, these measures of TFP gains are signi…cantly higher.
Conclusion
The model presented here captures the heterogeneity in the use of imported intermediate inputs prevalent in studies of plant-and …rm-level data, and is consistent with evidence on plant-level productivity gains from importing. The model has relatively few parameters that are easily related to observable moments of the cross-sectional distributions of imports and size in plant-level data. Trade liberalization generates large within-plant productivity gains that are distributed unevenly across plants: larger plants who import more gain more in productivity. This heterogeneity results in sizeable gains from trade that would not exist in a model in which all plants use identical input bundles.
A literal interpretation of the production technology in the model is that imports are perfect substitutes for domestic inputs, but may be available at a lower cost, so that importing a larger share lowers the average cost of production. More broadly, imported inputs could also yield productivity gains because imports are of higher quality than comparable domestic inputs, or because imported goods are imperfect substitutes for domestic goods.
The quality explanation, for example discussed in Grossman and Helpman (1991) , is studied in plant-level data for Mexico by Kugler and Verhoogen (2009) . Imperfect substitutability would generate gains from input variety as in Ethier (1982) and Romer (1990) . 9 Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2009) use data on the number of goods Hungarian …rms import to measure the relative magnitudes of the quality and substitutability channels. For the purposes of this paper, these explanations are isomorphic to the one proposed in my model, in that data on total domestic and imported expenditures at the plant level cannot distinguish between them. Blaum, Lelarge, and Peters (2013) show that more detailed data imply that producers di¤er systematically in the shares that they spend on individual products, a feature that is missing from my model as well as from most of the existing literature. Even then, this paper has shown that simply accounting for heterogeneous responses of plants in terms of their import share signi…cantly a¤ects the magnitude of the gains from trade. The Lagrangian of this problem is:
L =~ j (z; n) w j b (f n 1) + 0 (n 0) + 1 (1 n) where 0 ; 1 0, and the …rst order necessary condition is:
where the derivative of variable pro…t is given by:
From the complementary slackness conditions 0 n = 0 and 1 (1 n) = 0, it is clear that only one of 0 or 1 can be positive. For 0 > 0 and 1 = 0, @~ j (z;n) @n < w j bf n log f , so:
(1 ) zv j n j log j < w j bf n log f while when 1 > 0 and 0 = 0,
(1 ) zv j n j log j > w j bf n log f De…ne two cuto¤ z levels:
These come from the …rst order condition at equality for n = 0 and n = 1. Since z 1 = z 0 f j , z 1 > z 0 as long as f > j , which is the condition assumed in the text. Now, for z < z 0 , the left hand side of the …rst order condition (20) is:
(1 ) zv j n j log j w j bf n log f = w j b log f z 0 z n j w j bf n log f = w j b log f z z 0 n j f n < 0 for all n This implies 0 > 0 (and hence 1 = 0), so the optimal n (z) = 0. Similarly, for z > z 1 , the left hand side of (20) is positive for all n, implying 1 > 0 (and hence 0 = 0), so the optimal n (z) = 1. For z 2 (z 0 ; z 1 ), the solution to the …rst order condition at equality is an interior solution,
given by:
(1 ) zv j n j log j = w j bf n log f Taking logs of both sides and rearranging, n j (z) = 1 log f log j log z + log (1 ) v j log j w j b log f which leads to the solution given in (10). Now, to check the second order condition at this solution, the second derivative of the pro…t function is:
For the range where n is interior, @~ j (z;n) @n = w j bf n log f , so the second derivative of pro…t evaluated at the solution is:
@~ (z; n) @n log j w j bf n (log f ) 2 = bf n log f log j log f < 0 which is true again by the assumption that f > j .
Aggregation
The terms in the aggregated market clearing conditions (14) and (15) where the parameter combinations already pinned down from other moments are:
